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Article 9 of Japan's postwar constitution
subjects the nation to stringently worded
constraints on its legal capacity to wage war.
Although not the only constitution to include a
renunciation of war,1 Japan's postwar constitution
is unique in its prohibition of military forces that
make war possible.' The article reads:
Aspiring sincerely to an international
peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war as
a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as means of settling
international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air
forces as well as other war potential, will
never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be
recognized.
From inception, the article's meaning and
application was the object of controversy. For half
This paper developed out of a conference on "Waging War"
sponsored by the University of Alberta in November 2002.
James Hofman, a J.D. candidate at the School of Law,
Washington University in St. Louis provided research
assistance. The author is also deeply indebted to Professor
James E. Auer of Vanderbilt University for his painstaking
review of an earlier draft and his very helpful comments and
suggestions. All errors remain mine alone.
See e.g., Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines (1987),
art. 1L s. 2, which provides: "The Philippines renounces war as
an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations." Along with the
Philippines, McNelly adds France and Brazil to the list. See
Theodore McNelly, The Origins of Japan's Democratic
Constitution (Lanham, New York & Oxford: University Press
of Ainerica, 2000) at 148 [McNelly, Origins].
McNelly, Origins, ibid.
a century, article 9, and the questions of military
capacity and action it raises, defined the divide
between progressive and conservative political
ideologies. The fundamental and most contentious
legal and political issues were the legality of
Japan's security arrangements with the United
States - including the continued presence of
American military forces - and the maintenance of
military forces for any purpose. For over half a
century, lawsuits and criminal defence claims
challenging American military bases and the Self-
Defence Forces (SDF) have been a routine feature
of progressive political action. And corresponding
proposals to delete or amend the article
significantly continue to be an equally repeated
rejoinder by conservative politicians.
During the 1980s, controversy over these basic
issues faded as a political and legal consensus
affirming the legality of both U.S.-Japan mutual
security arrangements and the SDF evolved. In the
process, debate shifted to other concerns.
Although the disproportional U.S. military
presence on Okinawa has been raised as an issue
under article 9, the most significant question has
been Japan's legal capacity to engage in or even
contribute to collective security actions under
United Nations or other auspices, particularly
outside of East Asia. This issue has gained
particular intensity in the wake of the twin Iraqi
and North Korean crises. Events involving both
states have forced Japan to consider, once again,
its political and military role as a member of the
elite group of global economic and military
powers.
Also subject to reconsideration in the process is
the role of the judiciary in what the late Dan
Henderson viewed as Japan's peculiar system of
"double supremacy," in which the competence for
(2005) 14:2 CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM
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authoritative legal construction is shared by the
courts and the Diet.3 The line between law and
politics is hardly more clearly delineated in Japan,
however, than elsewhere. On the one hand, when
judges speak, they play a significant role in the
development of political consensus, and Japanese
judges explicitly look to the "sense of society" in
construing the law.4 When the courts remain
silent, however, they leave a vacuum to be filled
by other voices. In the case of Japan, the silence of
the Supreme Court has given one agency - the
Cabinet Legislation Bureau (Naikaku H6sei
Kyoku) a distinctive role in the interpretation of
article 9 and thereby imposed a lasting and
politically effective constitutional constraint on
Japan's capacity to wage war.
ISSUES
No one seriously questions the fundamental
prohibition of article 9: Japan may not engage in
or maintain military forces for the purpose of
"waging a war of aggression" as that term was
understood both prior to and at the end of World
War II.5 Were that all, however, article 9 could be
viewed as adding little to the obligations Japan
shares today with all states under the principles
embodied in the Kellogg-Briand Pact and
generally accepted principles of international law.
Does article 9 go further? Do its provisions subject
Japan to more stringent constraints than those that
apply to other states?
The most radical claim has been long settled:
that the renunciation of war as a sovereign right
extended even to self-defence. Japan's legal
capacity to enter bilateral security arrangements
with the United States for its defence hinged on
this issue. Even recognition of a theoretical right
to self-defence does not, however, fully resolve
the question of the constitutionality of
concomitant arrangements and actions. To what
extent, under article 9, is Japan permitted to
maintain any military forces or allowed to
participate in collective security actions in cases
where Japan is not under direct threat? May Japan
3 Dan Fenno Henderson, Foreign Enterprise in Japan (Chapel
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1973) at 173.
4 See e.g., John Owen Haley, The Spirit ofJapanese Law
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1998) at 156-76.
See e.g., Quincy Wright, "The Concept of Aggression in
International Law" (1935) 29 American Journal of International
Law 373.
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take precautionary measures considered necessary
for its national security either though protective
military arrangements with other states, or
unilateral military defence programs, or both?
Answering these questions still leaves other issues
unresolved. These issues include a pair of closely
related questions: whether any meaningful
distinctions may be made between military
weaponry, equipment, or facilities designed for
aggressive or defensive warfare; and, equally
important, especially in light of recent events,
whether distinctions may also be reasonably
drawn between "offensive" and "defensive"
military actions.
The distinction between offensive and
defensive actions becomes particularly poignant in
the context of collective security measures where
no direct or significant threat to Japanese security
may exist. As explained below, by the early
1980s, a legal and political consensus had
emerged, corresponding to Japan's actual military
capacity. Article 9 is widely, but not uniformly,
6
understood to prohibit aggressive actions and
related "war potential," but not "defensive"
actions, narrowly defined. It certainly does not
prohibit the maintenance of military forces for
defence or, with legislative authorization, non-
combat support for United Nations peacekeeping
operations (UNPKO) and similar military
operations abroad. Events in North Korea and Iraq
have challenged this consensus. The Koizumi
cabinet's decision to send a contingent of troops to
Iraq, as well the apparent support for revision of
the constitution signal a potentially significant
shift in both government policy and public
opinion.
Military capacity also matters. Japan today
possesses the most advanced anti-submarine, air
defence, and intelligence-gathering equipment,
including missile-mounted Aegis destroyers with
advanced detection and analysis systems. Some of
there were, in fact, deployed in the Indian Ocean
in support of the U.S. coalition action against
Afghanistan. With legislative authorization, Japan
also contributed logistically, but not with combat
forces, to UNPKO in Cambodia in 1993 and in
See "Zadankai (Roundtable discussion)," as well as articles and
commentary on art. 9 in (2004) 1260 Jurisuto 7. Unless
otherwise indicated by context or express attribution, all
translations fron Japanese are the author's.
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East Timor in 2002. Legislation enacted in June
2003 enables SDF forces to support the U.S. in
non-combat activities in Iraq. And in February
2004, a contingent of 500 Ground Self-Defence
Forces (GSDF) were sent to Iraq ostensibly for
"humanitarian and construction assistance." How
may these forces be utilized constitutionally? May
they be enhanced? If so, how? Is Japan's "war
potential" truly restrained? And above all, may
Japan constitutionally contribute to or participate
actively in these and other collective security
actions, even with legislative approval?
These are not idle questions. Japan apparently
lacks the military capability to make a preemptive
strike against a North Korean nuclear weapons
threat and, it seems, even the capacity to defend
effectively against a North Korean ballistic missile
attack.' In other words, Japan is not today in a
position to act autonomously even with respect to
its own defence. Public concern over this apparent
weakness appears to be moving the political
consensus towards allowing expansion of Japan's
military capacity to levels that many would have
thought unthinkable a decade ago and, perhaps,
even towards support of preemptive action. In
response to these questions, as constitutional law,
article 9 does seem to matter. Authoritative
interpretation of article 9 both shapes and
constrains public views, political consensus, and
governmental discretion.
A set of final questions remains. Who has the
competence or legal authority to construe article
9? Who determines its parameters? Are they
matters for judicial decision or political or
bureaucratic determination? In any event, what is
the role of precedent that is, how binding on
future courts or governments are past
determinations by the judiciary, past actions by
cabinets and the legislature, or past opinions by
any administrative agency? Or, indeed, is any
permanent or enduring legal construction
mandated or even politically possible or legally
required?
See Japan Defence Agency, "For the Future ofIraq," (14 March
2005), online: Japan Defence Agency <http://www.jda.go. jp/
e/index.htm>.
See e.g., "Agency Pondered Airstrikes for North" The Asahi
Shimtoun (9 April 2005), online: Asahi News <http://www.
asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200504090 142.html>.
History, judicial decision, and political
consensus provide some answers. As detailed
below, each affirms the proposition that the scope
of article 9 is limited to "aggressive war" and does
not apply to Japan's right to engage in military
action for self-defence, perceived as a fundamental
right common to all states. Article 9 thus allows
bilateral, as well as multilateral, arrangements for
self-defence. Article 9 is also perceived to allow
non-military aid and logistical support to UNPKO,
and even collective security actions.
The prohibition of "war potential" has been
more controversial and has been resolved with less
certainty. The Japanese government's early
statements were inconsistent. As late as March
1952, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida conceded
that article 9 prohibited Japan from maintaining
even defensive military forces.9 Nevertheless, over
time, a political (and bureaucratic) consensus with
broad public support emerged. For over two
decades, article 9 has been construed by the
Japanese government to permit the SDF and, at
least with specific legislative approval, their role
in collective security actions not directly related to
the defence of Japan, so long as the forces did not
engage in active combat."0 No consensus appears
to have been reached however, with respect to
other issues, among them, for example, the
deployment of combat forces in collective self-
defence actions or the legal capacity to maintain
weapons capable of preemptive military action.
Thus, the constitutionality of legislation allowing
the cabinet to authorize any deployment or the
acquisition of such weaponry has not yet been
fully addressed, either politically or judicially.
The discretion of the Diet and the cabinet over
defence policy remains legally restricted. The
ultimate authority to define these boundaries and,
thus, the extent to which either Diet or cabinet
actions are constitutional, remains with the courts.
In other words, the fifteen justices of Japan's
Supreme Court have the final word. They
Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, Statement of 10 Mar 1952,
quoted in James E. Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of
Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945 71 (New York: Praeger,
1973) at 122 [Auer, Postwar Rearmament].
As detailed below, the 2003 White Paper on Defence Policy
made a subtle but potentially significant change in the wording
of the government's position that would presumably permit the
dispatch of military forces and at least the incidental use of
armed force.
(2005) 14:2 CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM
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collectively retain the competence to set the outer
limits of Japan's constitutional capacity to wage
war. Yet the Court has not fully exercised its
authority. The Court has determined that the
constitutionality of bilateral and multilateral
security arrangements, taken with or without
specific legislative approval, depends on the
perception of judges whether such actions
constitute unmistakably "clear" violations of
article 9. The Court has yet to rule, however, on
the constitutionality of the SDF or even whether
its rulings on bilateral security arrangements also
define the scope of the Diet's political authority
with respect to the maintenance of the SDF. Until
it does so, a legal vacuum will persist. This
vacuum has been filled in part by contending
politicians, with supporting opinions of allied
lawyers and legal scholars. The silence of the
Court, however, has given the Cabinet Legislation
Bureau unparalleled influence over defence policy
through the Bureau's authority to issue advisory
legal opinions on constitutional issues. The
consequence, as stated above and detailed below,
has been a significant and lasting constitutional
constraint on the political capacity of successive
governments to determine Japan's defence policy.
HISTORY
The origins of article 9 remain a mystery.
12
Few today fully credit Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers Douglas MacArthur's public
attribution of Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara as
the source, although Shidehara remains a plausible
choice.13 Some believe that MacArthur himself
conceived the idea. Dale Hellegers suggests that
the idea may have come to MacArthur via a
similar provision in the 1935 Philippine
I am enormously indebted to James E. Auer for suggesting that
the failure of the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality
of the SDF has contributed significantly to the influence of the
Cabinet Legislation Bureau interpretation of art. 9.
12 For a concise history of art. 9 in Japanese, see Takami
Katsutoshi, I Chushaku kenpa (General Commentary on
Constitutional Law) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2000) at 376-88
[Katsutoshi]. For an account by one of the key Japanese
participants in the drafting process, who in 1947 became
Director of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, see Sato Tatsuo,
Nihon KenpO Seiritsu Shi (History of the Establishment of the
Constitution of Japan) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1964).
See e.g., Theodore McNelly, "General Douglas MacArthur and
the Constitutional Disarmament of Japan" (1982) 17
Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Third Series I
[McNelly, "General Douglas MacArthur"].
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Constitution, 14 which Hellegers assumes would
have been well known to MacArthur. 5 Charles
Kades, deputy chief of Government Section,
actually drafted the provision as chair of the secret
steering committee responsible for the initial draft
of the constitution. He raised the possibility that
the idea originated with Emperor Hirohito. 6
Theodore McNeely, on the other hand, argues that
Kades himself was the most likely source, an
attribution made in Kades' presence that he did
not expressly disavow.'
7
Whatever its origin, the clause reflects
MacArthur's determination that a renunciation of
war be included in the postwar Japanese
constitution. As described by Kades:
MacArthur had directed [Courtney]
Whitney [Chief of Government Section]
to have the Government Section draft a
model for a constitution to be handed to
[Prime Minister Shigeru] Yoshida and
[State Minister Joji] Matsumoto for their
consideration at the meeting which the
Japanese had postponed to the following
week .... Whitney handed me a legal-size
sheet of green-lined yellow paper on
which were handwritten, in pencil, notes
that Whitney said were to be used as the
basis for a model constitution.18
Art. 11, s. 3, of the 1935 Constitution (also included, as noted
supra note 1, in the 1987 Constitution) provided: "The
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy."
However, art. II, s. 2, made the "defence of the State... a prime
duty of the Government and the people." See Enrique M.
Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines (Dobbs Ferry:
Oceana Publications, 1974) at LII (Appendix B). The language
of s. 3 was identical to art. I of the Kellog-Briand Pact.
Dale M. Hellegers, We the Japanese People: World War 11 and
the Origins of the Japanese Constitution, vol. 2 (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2001) at 576 [Appendix C]
[Hellegers].
Charles L. Kades, "The American Role in Revising Japan's
Imperial Constitution" (1989) 104 Political Science Quarterly
215 at 218 [Kades, "The American Role"].
1 McNelly, "General Douglas McArthur," supra note 13 at 9, 32.
See Charles L. Kades, "Discussion of Professor Theodore
McNelly's Paper, 'General Douglas MacArthur and the
Constitutional Disarmament of Japan' (1982) 17 Transactions
of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Third Series 35 [Kades,
"Discussion"]. Kades could have suggested a renunciation of
war provision but, without first-hand knowledge of
MacArthur's thoughts, could not have known whether such
remark could have been the source for MacArthur's idea.
Kades repeatedly stated that he could not tell whether
MacArthur or Whitney had written the notes because their
handwriting was so similar. See McNelly, ibid at 15-16; Kades,
ibid at 224.
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The MacArthur/Whitney notes included this
provision:
War as a sovereign right of the nation is
abolished. Japan renounces it as an
instrumentality for settling its disputes
and even preserving its own security. It
relies upon the higher ideals which are
now stirring the world for its defence and
its protection.
No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force
will ever be authorized and no right of
belligerency will ever be conferred upon
any Japanese force.' 9
Kades, drafting the article, rewrote the
MacArthur/Whitney notes to read:
Article 8. War as a sovereign right of the
nation is abolished. The threat of use of
force is forever renounced as a means
for settling disputes with any other nation
... . No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air
Force will ever be authorized and no right
of belligerency will ever be conferred
upon any Japanese force.20
Kades deleted the critical phrase "even
preserving its own security," as he explained to
Whitney, because to say a country could not
defend itself was "unrealistic."'" He appears to
have had in mind the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact,
which both condemned "recourse to war for the
solution of international controversies" and
"renounced war as an instrument of national
policy in their relations with one another" (article
1).22 Like article 9, as drafted by Kades, the
Kellog-Briand Pact did not explicitly distinguish
between "aggressive" and "defensive" war. Nor
did the Pact include any mention of a residual
right to self-defence. However, the renunciation of
war was understood, at the insistence of the
United States, not to extend to defensive military
I Kades, ibid. at 224.
20 See Takayanagi Kenzo, Ohtomo ichiro & Tanaka Hideo, eds.,
Nihon Koku Kempo seitei no katei [Making of the Constiution
of Japan], Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1973) at 244.
McNelly, " General Douglas MacArthur," supra note 13 at 17.
22 See remarks by Kades to Osamu Nishi during a 13 November
1984 interview, quoted in Osamu Nishi, The Constitution and
the National Defence Law System in Japan (Tokyo: Seibundo,
1987) at 9 [Nishi].
action. As the United States' official note of
transmission of the proposed pact emphasized,
"[lthere is nothing in the language of the pact" that
"restricts or impairs in any way the right of self-
defence. 23
Kades' version was then approved by
MacArthur and included in the "model"
constitution presented to the Japanese government
at the home of the foreign minister on 13 February
1946. The draft was subsequently reworked from
the morning of March 4 to the evening of 5 March
1946, with the members of both the SCAP
steering committee and members of the Japanese
Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee
chaired by State Minister Joji Matsumoto. During
the course of this marathon negotiating session,
the text of the provision was further revised to
read as a renumbered article 9:
The recognition of war as a sovereign
right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as means of settling international
disputes is forever abolished as a means
of settling disputes with other nations.
The maintenance of land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, and
the right of belligerency of the state will
not be recognized.24
The draft was next reviewed by the Yoshida
cabinet and submitted to the Diet in the form of a
bill to amend the Imperial Constitution of 1889.
The government's first official interpretation of
article 9 was that it did not deny Japan the right of
self-defence but did prohibit war and even
defensive armaments.2 5 The article was then
amended further by the Diet's Constitutional
Amendments Committee, chaired by Ashida
Hitoshi. The Ashida amendments added
introductory phrases to each of the article's two
paragraphs for the official purpose of "making it
clear that the resolve to renounce war and to
abolish armaments is motivated solely by
"Press Notice of Identic Notes of Transmission of [Draft]
Multinational Treaty for Renunciation of War, June 23, 1928"
(reproduced in (1928) 22 American Journal of International
Law: Official Documents 109). See also Quincy Wright, "The
Meaning of the Pact of Paris" (1935) 27 American Journal of
International Law 39.
See Hellegers, supra note 15, vol. 2 at 677-78.
McNelly, "General Douglas MacArthur," supra note 13 at 31.
(2005) 14:2 CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM
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aspiration for the concord and cooperation of
mankind and for the pace of the world. 26 Ashida
was later to explain that the aim of the
amendments was to clarify Japan's right to self-
defence.2 The Diet seems to have recognized
Ashida's claim at the time in that article 66 was
also amended to restrict members of the cabinet to
civilians.28 Nevertheless, at least among legal
scholars, the view prevailed that Japan may not
have renounced its inherent right of self-defence
in an abstract sense but that article 9 did seem to
prohibit the nation from maintaining military
forces of any kind for whatever purpose.2 9 This
view, which, as noted, even Prime Minister
Yoshida once endorsed, would have required
Japan to depend permanently upon military forces
provided by others particularly the United States
for its security.
Why the Americans and Japanese responsible
for drafting article 9 did not make a right of self-
defence explicit or clarify whether and for what
purposes military forces could be maintained was
perhaps best explained by Kades in a 25 May
1989 interview. Kades told the author that he
feared popular American reaction against the
constitution had article 9 expressly recognized an
inherent right of self-defence. After all, he noted,
Japan had justified military invasion of China and
Southeast Asia, not to mention Pearl Harbor, as
acts of self-defence. Kades could have added that,
as noted above, the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact
similarly makes no explicit mention of a right to
self-defence but was understood by all not to
restrict acts of legitimate self-defence. Similarly,
and carefully read in context, the comments by
Prime Minister Yoshida during the deliberations in
the Diet that any explicit recognition of a right of
self-defence would be "too dangerous,"3 could be
understood as an implicit expression of concern
Official Gazette Extra, No. 35 (26 August 1946) 7, cited in
Kades, "Discussion," supra note 17 at 40.
2- McNelly, "General Arthur MacArthur," supra note 13 at 31.
Katsutoshi, supra note 12 at 388. Auer (citing a document
authored by Tatsuo Sato for the Commission on the
Constitution and McNelly) notes that SCAP actually proposed
the amendment at the insistence of the Far East Commission,
forcing the Japanese to coin the Chinese character compound
hunmin for "civilian." Auer, supra note 9 at 47-48.
21 See McNelly, Origins, supra note I at 149. See also Kenzo
Takayanagi, "Some Reminiscences of Japan's Commission on
the Constitution" (1968) 43 Washington Law Review 961 at
973.
30 See Nishi, supra note 22 at 5.
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over Japanese wartime justifications and possible
American public reaction.
With almost unanimous approval of the new
constitution by both houses of the Diet and
promulgation by the Emperor in the autumn of
1946, the postwar constitution with, article 9,
became effective on 3 May 1947. Thenceforth,
notwithstanding academic or popular views, the
Japanese government and the Occupation
authorities consistently interpreted article 9 as not
including a renunciation of an inherent right of
self-defence. However, their positions on the issue
of "war potential" were less consistent.
Nevertheless, within weeks of article 9 becoming
effective (and two years before "containment" and
the "reverse course"), the National Safety Agency
was created. 31 A year later, Japan established a
coast guard. And then, in the wake of the Korean
War, at MacArthur's direction, the National Police
Reserve was established and Japanese
minesweepers were sent to support UN forces,
resulting in the first, and presumably only, post
World War II Japanese combat casualties. 2 As the
Allied Occupation ended and Japan regained full
sovereignty, the 195 1 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
33
came into effect on 28 April 1952. By August, the
coast guard and Police Reserve were merged into
a new National Security Force. Two years later, in
March 1954, the Defence Agency was
established.34 By organizing the National Security
Force and coast guard into separate Ground and
Maritime Self-Defence Forces, while adding a
new Air Self-Defence Force, the three SDFs were
formed .
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Since 1947, Japan's judges have decided
about two dozen civil and criminal cases involving
constitutional challenges to Japan's security
Japan, Hoancho ho (National Safety Agency Law), Law No.
265 (1947).
32 James E. Auer, "Article Nine: Renunciation of War" in P.R.
Luney & K. Takahashi, eds., Japanese Constitutional Law
(Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1993) 79 [Auer, "Article
Nine"]. Auer notes that two minesweepers were sunk, one
Japanese sailor was killed, and eight others were injured.
3 Reproduced in (1952) 46 American Journal of International
Law: Official Documents 91.
34 Japan, Boeicho sochi ho (Self-Defence Agency Establishment
Law), Law No. 164 (1954).
Japan, Jieitai ho (Self-Defence Forces Law), Law No. 165
(1954).
HeinOnline  -- 14 Const. F. 23 2005
arrangements with the United States and the
establishment and role of the SDF. Statistics are
not available on the total number of lawsuits filed
that have included a constitutional challenge to
U.S. and Japanese military forces, nor are all
judgments reported. However, the most inclusive
source of judicial decisions lists sixty-seven
separate pronouncements, including appellate
court judgments.36 Closer examination reveals
fewer actual judgments and even fewer cases. In
many instances, several separate civil or criminal
actions with similar claims or arising out of the
same incidents were consolidated. All in all,
between 1951 and 2001, there appear to be about
twenty-five separate cases, including appeals. The
Supreme Court has adjudicated appeals in seven,7
only one of which, the Sunakawa case," was a
precedent-setting en banc decision. With two
exceptions, both decisions that affirmed
Sunakawa,39 all of the others were decided by a
five-justice petty bench.
Handed down in 1959, the Sunakawa case was
the first Supreme Court decision on the
constitutionality of Japan's defence policies. In it,
all fifteen justices endorsed the view that Japan
retained a fundamental right of self-defence and
See CD-Rom: Hanrei taikei [Precedents Digest] (Tokyo: Tokyo
Daiichi Hoki) [HT CD-ROM].
Sakaa v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225, HT CD-ROM Case ID No.
27660683 (Sup. Ct. G.B., Dec. 16, 1959) [Sunakawa],
translated with commentary in John M. Maki, Court and
Constitution in Japan: Selected Supreme Court Decisions,
1948 60 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964) at
298-361[Maki]; Japan v. Shiino, 359 Hanrei jih6 12, HT CD-
ROM Case ID No. 27760754 (Sup. Ct. 2" P.B., Dec. 25, 1963);
Japan v. Sakane, 214 Hanrei taimuzu 260, HTI CD-ROM Case
ID No. 27670505 (Sup. Ct. G.B., April2, 1969) [Sakane], trans.
in H. Itoh & L. Beer, eds., The Constitutional Case Law o f
Japan. Selected Supreme Court Decisions, 1961-70 (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1978) at 103-31; Sakane It6 v.
Japan, 94 Zaimush6 shiry6 138, HT CD-ROM Case ID No.
21057680 (Sup. Ct. 3d P.B., April 19, 1977) [it6]; lto v.
Minister ofAgriculture and Forestry, 36 Minshu 1679, HTI CD-
ROM Case ID No. 27000070 (Sup. Ct. I" P.B., Sept. 9, 1982)
[Naganuma]; Japan v. Ishitsuka, 43 Minshu 385, HTI CD-ROM
Case ID No. 27431916 (Sup. Ct. 3 d P.B., June 20, 1989)
[Hyakuri Base]; Ota v. Hashimoto, 50 Minshu 1952, HT CD-
ROM Case ID No. 28011109 (Sup. Ct. G.B., Aug. 28, 1996)
[Okinawa Bases], translated in Prominent Judgments of the
Supreme Court, online <http://courts.go.jp/promjudg.nsf>.
Sunakawa, ibid. On remand, the Tokyo District Court found the
defendants to be guilty. Japan v. Sakata, 255 Hanrei jiho 8303
(Tokyo Dist. Ct., Mar. 27, 1962).
39 The two other en bane decisions of the Supreme Court dealing
with an art. 9 challenge were Japan v. Sakane and Ota v.
Hashimoto, supra note 37. Both dealt primarily with other
constitutional issues but the question of the constitutionality of
the 1951 Security Treaty was also raised. And in both the
Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in the Sunakawa case.
could enter into treaties for mutual security. The
Court also established parameters for judicial
review and thereby the scope of legislative and
executive discretion. In the absence of an
unmistakable or "clear" violation, the courts were
to defer to the judgment of the political branches
on the issue of constitutionality. The Sunakawa
case has remained the controlling interpretation of
article 9 for half a century.
The decision reversed and remanded a Tokyo
District Court decision by a three-judge panel. The
judgment, authored by presiding judge Akio Date,
held that the Japan's 195 1 Security Treaty with the
United States was unconstitutional under article 9.
The case involved the prosecution of
demonstrators charged with criminal trespass for
unauthorized entry on the U.S. Tachikawa Air
Base outside of Tokyo during a protest against the
acquisition of land for the expansion of a runway.
Acquitting the defendants, Judge Date reasoned
that the statutory basis for the prosecution was
legally invalid because the crime of criminal
trespass for entry onto an American military base
in Japan had been enacted pursuant to the
implementation of the 1951 Security Treaty,
which provided for the maintenance of war
potential in Japan in violation of article 9. In a
special appeal bypassing the intermediate
appellate court, all fifteen justices endorsed
reversal of Judge Date's decision. The decision of
the Court explicitly determined that article 9 does
not deny Japan's "inherent right of self-defence,"
nor does it disable Japan from taking necessary
measures for its own "peace and security,"
including collective security actions under the
auspices of the United Nations or under bilateral
security arrangements with the United States,
including the 1951 Security Treaty. The Court
also interpreted maintenance of war potential to
mean the resort to "aggressive war through the
maintenance by our country of what is termed war
potential and the exercise of rights of command
and control over it.",40 Thus, the Court expressly
subscribed to a view that the SDF might possibly
be considered to violate article 9 as war potential
under the "command and control" of the Japanese
government. However, the Court held that the
District Court had exceeded its judicial authority
in determining the constitutionality of the 1951
40 Maki, supra note 37 at 304.
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Security Treaty, thereby precluding a
determinative judicial decision on the
constitutionality of the Treaty or the stationing of
U.S. forces in Japan under article 9. Ten of the
fifteen justices added supplementary opinions. All
agreed with the disposition of the case the
reversal of Judge Date's decision and remand -
and all endorsed the interpretation of article 9 with
respect to an inherent right of self-defence and the
constitutionality of the 1951 Security Treaty.
Three justices (Kotaro Tanaka, Tamotsu Shima,
and Daisuke Kawamura), writing separate
supplementary opinions, expressly agreed with the
Court's opinion that Japan possesses a sovereign
right of self-defence and that both bilateral and
multilateral security arrangements are
constitutional. Justice Tanaka noted that in article
9, Japan renounces "aggressive war" but made no
explicit reference to the application of article 9 to
the maintenance of "war potential" under Japanese
control. Justice Shima, however, expressed
agreement with the determination that article 9
only covers war potential under Japanese
command and control. Three justices (Hachiro
Fujita, Toshio Iriye, and Katsumi Tarumi)
expressed no opinion on the constitutional issues
in the case except to agree that the District Court
had exceeded its constitutional authority by
reviewing an "act of government," analogous to
the "political question" doctrine in the United
States. Three others (Katsushige Otani, Ken' ichi
Okuno, and Kiyoshi Takahashi) took issue with
the majority with respect to the justiciability of the
issues raised, arguing that the courts did have the
competence to adjudicate the constitutional issues
raised by the Treaty. One (Shu' ichi Ishizaka)
made an impassioned argument against any
interpretation of article 9 that would deny Japan
the right to self-defence or the capacity to
maintain military forces for its own protection and
agreed with Justices Otani and Okuno that the
issue in this case was justiciable.
Over the course of nearly five decades since
the Sunakawa decision, litigants have used various
stratagems to challenge the legitimacy of U.S.-
Japan security arrangements. The most recent
Supreme Court decision was in 1996 in Ota v.
Hashimoto, or the Okinawa Bases case. 4' The case
arose as a result of the refusal of Okinawa
Okinawa Bases, supra note 34.
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landowners to renew leases of land used by U.S.
armed forces. Their refusal to consent to the
renewal forced the government to commence
formal expropriation proceedings, which, under
the applicable statute and regulations, required
certain reports related to the land in question to be
signed either by the owners or the appropriate
local officials. Upon their refusal, the director of
the Naha Defence Facilities Administration
Agency sought instead the signature of the
Masahide Ota as governor of Okinawa Prefecture.
He also refused. Thereupon, Prime Minister
Ryfltaro Hashimoto ordered the governor to sign
the documents pursuant to provisions of the Local
Autonomy Law. Governor Ota again refused and
Prime Minister Hashimoto filed a petition in
special proceedings in the Naha Branch of the
Fukuoka High Court for a judicial order to require
Governor Ota to perform his legal duty under the
law. On 25 March 1996, the Court issued the
order, finding that Ota's failure to comply
constituted a dereliction of his official duties and
seriously impaired the public interest. On appeal,
the Supreme Court en bane affirmed the lower
court decision. In the decision, the Court expressly
reaffirmed the continuing validity of the
Sunakawa decision, upholding the
constitutionality under article 9 of the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty under which, by extension,
implementing legislation and the related measures
for leasing land were also deemed to be
constitutional.
The Court's reasoning in Ota v. Hashimoto
echoed the rationale of lower court decisions. In
similar challenges to the legality of U.S. bases in
Okinawa, the City of Naha, Okinawa, and two
groups of private citizens filed separate lawsuits in
1985 against the Kaifu cabinet. They sought
judicial revocation of certain administrative
measures allowing the use of land within the city
by the U.S. military. The plaintiffs argued that
these measures were illegal because of the
underlying unconstitutionality of the U.S.- Japan
Security Treaty in general, certain of its
provisions, as well as implementing legislation
and related administrative actions. In a
consolidated judgment handed down in 1990,42 the
Naha City v. Kaifu, 727 Hanfrei taimuzu 118, HT CD-ROM
Case ID No. 27806665 (Naha Dist. Ct., May 29, 1990),
annotated in (1990) 34 The Japanese Annual of International
Laws 157.
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Naha District Court rejected each claim. Adhering
to the reasoning of the majority of justices in the
Sunakawa decision, the three-judge panel noted
that Japan retains an intrinsic sovereign right to
self-defence that it may secure by mutual security
arrangements with the United States. Article 9, the
Court continued, does not prohibit the
maintenance in Japan of military equipment not
under the direct command and control of the
Japanese government. The judges dismissed the
action, concluding that the plaintiff had not shown
that the Security Treaty or any of the other
challenged measures constituted an unmistakably
"clear" violation of article 9.
In 1991, the Kanazawa District Court
similarly rejected an effort to regulate use of U.S.
military aircraft in Japan. On grounds repeated
with approval by the Nagoya High Court in 1994,
the District Court rejected claims of
constitutionality against U.S. military and Air
Self-Defence Force use of the Komatsu Air Field.
The two courts rejected the plaintiffs' petition for
a court order to terminate or at least regulate U.S.
military flights at the base to prevent noise
pollution. 43 The two courts also agreed, however,
that flights by the Air Self-Defence Force were
subject to regulation, and the High Court upheld
with modification the District Court's damage
awards.
Progressive litigants and their lawyers have
also repeatedly challenged the constitutionality of
the SDF.44 In several, like Sunakawa and the 1969
Sakane case,45 the issue has been raised in defence
to a criminal prosecution. The Eniwa case 46 is
typical. It involved the criminal prosecution of the
Nozaki brothers under article 121 of the SDF Law.
The prosecution accused the brothers of having
cut telephone lines to the SDF training facility at
Fukuda v. Japan, 886 Hanrei taimuzu 114, HT CD-ROM Case
ID No. 27826961 (Nagoya High Ct., Dec. 26, 1994)],
modifying and affirming in part the decision by Kanazawa
District Court, 754 Hanrei taimuzu 74, HT-CD-ROM Case ID
No. 27808655 (Kanazawa Dist. Ct., Mar. 13, 1991).
44 For an introductory analysis of the early cases in Japanese, see
Katsutoshi, supra note 12 at 403, 416, 429-30, 486. For
discussion of these and other cases in English, see Nishi, supra
note 22 at 25-29. For a relatively recent taxpayer suit, see Qno
v. Japan, 771 Hanrei taimizu 116, HT CD-ROM Case ID No.
22004601 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 17, 1991), dismissed for lack
of standing and interest to sue.
41 Sakane, supra note 37.
4, Japan v. Nozaki, 9 Kakyu keishu 359 (Sapporo Dist. Ct., Mar.
29, 1967) [Eniwa].
Eniwa, Hokkaido. By dismissing the case on the
grounds that telephone wires did not come within
the definition of "an implement used for military
defence" for purposes of criminal prosecution
under the SDF Law, the Sapporo District Court
avoided the constitutional issue. Only twice,
however, has any court fully reached the merits -
in both instances at the district court level - and
only once has a court held the SDF to be
unconstitutional. This was the Naganuma case,
which was filed almost immediately after the
Eniwa decision.
The plaintiffs were all residents of Naganuma,
a village in Hokkaido. They claimed that the
village watershed would be damaged by the
construction of an SDF Nike missile site and anti-
aircraft training facility in what had previously
been designated as a national forest preserve. A
statutorily mandated finding of a "public interest"
had been required to effect the requisite change in
the designation of the forest. In a decision
authored by presiding judge Shigeo Fukushima,
the Court declared that the change in designation
was invalid inasmuch as the SDF constituted "war
potential" in violation of article 9, because their
intended use of the preserve could not be deemed
to be in the public interest. 4' The decision was
predictably reversed by the Sapporo High Court
on appeal, denying the reviewability of the
constitutionality of the SDF.49 The plaintiffs
appealed and, as expected, in 1982, the Supreme
Court affirmed the High Court judgmenti0
Progressive political efforts to bypass the Diet and
achieve an authoritative judicial decision on the
constitutionality of the SDF essentially ended with
the Supreme Court's decision that, because
measures had been taken to preserve the
watershed, the residents of Naganuma no longer
had standing (legal interest) to sue. Thus, the
Court avoided review of the Naganuma decision
on the merits.
47 ItO v. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, 712 Hanrei jiho 24
(Sapporo Dist. Ct., Sept. 7, 1973) [Naganuma].
In an earlier decision on preliminary relief in the same case,
Judge Fukushima had ordered that the change in designation be
suspended thereby precluding the construction of the SDF
facilities until the adjudication of the case on the merits was
complete. The Sapporo High Court reversed and remanded this
decision. The SDF was thus able to complete construction of
the disputed facilities before the 1973 district court judgment.
4 43 Gyoshu 1175,HT CD-ROM Case ID No. 2700135 (Sapporo
High Ct., Aug. 5, 1976).
Auer, "Article Nine," supra note 32.
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In addition to Naganuma, the Supreme Court
has decided only two challenges to the
constitutionality of the SDF: the 1977 decision in
It6 v. Japan"1 and Japan v. Ishitsuka, the Hyakuri
Base case.52 In It6 v. Japan, the Third Petty Bench
rejected a claim for injunctive relief against
funding for the SDF and for "war pollution." The
Court found that the plaintiffs had no standing
based on their claim of religious conviction. In the
Hyakuri Base case, the Court again avoided the
issue, affirming a Tokyo High Court decision that
had upheld a Mito District Court decision, but on
separate grounds. The Mito court's judgment in
the case was significant as the first judicial
decision expressly applying the Sunakawa
rationale to the constitutionality of the SDF. The
case involved a sale of land, originally to be sold
to the government to be used for an SDF base, to
a private buyer opposed to the SDF. The buyer did
not pay and the seller concluded the originally
intended sale with the government. Both seller and
the state sued for confirmation of the state's
ownership and transfer of registration. The buyer
countered that inasmuch as the SDF were
unconstitutional, any sale to the government for
purposes of SDF use violated the general private
law requirement of "public order and good
morals" under article 90 of the Civil Code. On the
merits, the Mito District Court upheld Japan's
right to self-defence under article 9 as a justiciable
legal issue but declared that the legality of the
SDF and its facilities was not reviewable. Unless
unmistakably "clear" that the forces or their use
were unconstitutional, the Court reasoned, such
issues under article 9 are left to political decision.
The Tokyo High Court and Supreme Court
quashed the appeal on the grounds that article 9
was not applicable in the context of private law
disputes. Neither court ruled on either the
constitutionality of the SDF or the justiciability of
the issue.
Opponents of the SDF continue to seek
judicial condemnation of the SDF. The Tokyo and
Osaka District Courts have both dismissed actions
brought to have SFD participation in UNPKO
Ito, supra note 37.
HyakuriBase, supra note 37, affirming 1004 HanreijihQ 3, HT
CD-ROM Case ID No. 27431916 (Tokyo High Ct., July 7,
1981); 842 Hanrei jih! 22, HT CD-ROM Case ID No.
27441813 (Mito Dist. Ct., Feb. 17, 1977).
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declared illegal.53 In the Tokyo case, the District
Court handed down a consolidated judgment
dismissing lawsuits brought by 286 plaintiffs
seeking injunctive relief and damages, as well as
judicial confirmation of the illegality of the
Japanese government's dispatching SDF units in
aid of UNPKO in Cambodia in 1993. It first
dismissed (kyakka) the claim for damages for a
violation of constitutional rights on procedural
grounds for failure to present a legally cognizable
claim. The other suits were dismissed on the
merits (kikyakku) for lack of a legally protected
interest for the remedy sought.
Suits have been similarly brought and
dismissed against government decisions to provide
funding, humanitarian aid and SDF naval vessels
to assist the U.S.-led military operations in the
first Gulf War.5 4 Most recently, Noboru Minowa,
a former Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) member
of the House of Representatives, whose political
career also included service as posts and tele-
communications minister as well as parliamentary
vice-defence minister, filed suit in the Sapporo
District Court on 28 January 2004 to halt dispatch
of the troops to Iraq.5 Typical of these suits was
the group of consolidated administrative actions
brought in the Osaka District Court against the
Murayama cabinet for revocation of its decision to
dispatch SDF naval forces to the Persian Gulf and
confirmation of the unconstitutionality of these
actions.56 The Court dismissed the actions for
failure to state a judicially recognizable claim in
the case of the declaratory judgment and lack of
prerequisite "interest" for the action to be
sustained.
Despite lack of an affirming Supreme Court
decision, the Mito District Court opinion in
Hyakuri Base case continues to express the
prevailing view. The establishment of the SDF
Aokiv. Japan, 1619 Hanrei jih6 45, HT CD-ROM Case ID No.
28030102 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Mar. 12, 1997); Handa v. Japan,
1592 Hanrei jih6 113, HT CD-ROM Case ID No. 28020641
(Osaka Dist. Ct., May 20, 1996).
14 Aoki v. Japan, 927 Hanrei taimuzu 94, HT CD-ROM Case ID
No. 28011360 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Mar. 27, 1996); Otsu v.
Murayama, 900 Hanrei taimuzu 171, HT CD-ROM Case ID
No. 28010176 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Oct. 25, 1995) [Persian
GuIDeployment].
"Ex-posts Minister Sues over SDF Dispatch to Traq, Demands
10,000 yen" Japan Times (30 January 2004), online: Japan
Times <http ://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.
p15?nn20040 I 30a8.htm>.
16 Persian Gulf Deployment, supra note 54.
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was not unconstitutional but the size, kind, and
use of the force pose potential constitutional issues
that the courts should leave undefined unless and
until a judicially determined line is crossed and the
outer limits of constitutionally acceptable action
are transgressed. Within these still-undefined
parameters - what the justices in the Sunakawa
case referred to an unmistakably "clear" violation
the courts were to leave these issues to the Diet
and the cabinet for political decision, which, in
effect, left them to the interpretation of the
Cabinet Legislation Bureau.
In all of these cases, including the Supreme
Court's Eniwa and Hyakuri Base decisions and
recent district court decisions dismissing actions
for lack of standing or an interest to sue, the courts
have at least tacitly reaffirmed their ultimate
authority not only to construe the constitution but
also to define under the constitution their own
competence for judicial review. No judges
question their ultimate authority to adjudicate the
issue, but they have allowed the constitutionality
of the SDF and their role to remain undetermined.
By abstaining, they defer to the Diet and the
cabinet, permitting the government and, above
all, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau - to define
constitutionally permissible defence policy, but
only within the outer parameters judges
themselves have established. The prevailing
principle that emerged from Sunakawa confirms
both the competence of the judiciary to construe
article 9, but also permits the political branch
significant discretion to set defence policy. In
other words, the Diet and cabinet are permitted to
act only to the extent that the judiciary considers
their actions acceptable. The judiciary continues to
have final say as to the legality of the SDF and
their role. In effect, both the courts exercising their
constitutionally explicit authority of judicial
review, as well as the political branches of
government, have separate spheres of authority
that in practice produce a shared competence. So
long as the courts defer to the political branches,
the issue might be viewed as left to political
decisions, and thus to potentially fluctuating
constructions. In practice, however, the Cabinet
Legislation Bureau's interpretation of what article
9 permits has become the controlling authority.
IN THE SHADOW OF THE CABINET
LEGISLATION BUREAU
The lack of a ruling by the Supreme Court on
the constitutionality of the SDF on the merits, or
even a decision as to whether the Sunakawa
approach applies, has left a vacuum, filled by
disparate voices. Without a definitive Supreme
Court decision on the constitutionality of the SDF,
or even the reviewability of the issue, these issues
have remained contentious, sustaining repeated
conservative demands for revision of article 9.
57
The legal vacuum left by the Court also produced
demand for alternative authority, thereby
empowering individuals and agencies most
effectively claiming competence to render an
authoritative opinion. In the end, the Cabinet
Legislative Bureau emerged as the single most
influential actor.
Political ideology and aspirations aside, as a
matter of policy, every government since 1952 -
including the Social Democratic-Liberal
Democratic coalition government (1994-1996)
has affirmed the legality of Japan's security
arrangements and the SDF. They have all done so
with supporting advisory opinions from the
Cabinet Legislation Bureau in hand.
The Bureau's most significant pronouncement
was made in 1960 in response to opposition to the
revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In answer to
questions raised by opposition party leaders, the
Bureau affirmed the Kishi cabinet's position. The
Sunakawa decision had been handed down in
December 1959, determining the basic issue of the
constitutionality of the Treaty. As then-Director
Shfiz6 Hayashi later recalled, most of the
questions related to the role of U.S. Forces in the
region and the extent to which the Japanese
government had to approve, or at least be notified,
of such deployment. 5' These issues were to
For a recent call for revision, see Shugiin Kempo Chosakai
(House of Representatives Constitution Investigation
Commission), Interim Report (November 5, 2002), online:
House of Representatives <http://www.shugiin.go.jp>.
Hayashi Shuz6, "H6sei kyoku jidai no omoide H6sei kyoku
no katsud6 to anpo j6yaku no koto (Recollections of My Time
With the Legislation Bureau Legislation Bureau Activities
and the Security Treaty)" [Shfiz6] in Naikaku H6sei Kyoku
Hyakkunenshi Hensh6 'inkai, ed., Sh6gen: Kindai h6sei no
kisek i Naikaku Hosei Kyoku no kais6 (Testimony: The
Locus of Legislation in the Modern Era Reflections on the
Cabinet Legislation Bureau) (Tokyo: Gy6sei, 1985) 9.
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become quite critical in the mid-1960s during the
Vietnam War, but they were largely resolved by
the end of the decade. Of more lasting significance
were views expressed that Japan could only
engage in combat activities independently
(kobetsu-teki ni), and only when directly attacked
or at least threatened. Article 9 did not permit
Japan to otherwise participate in mutual security
operations.5 9
Article 9, as construed, could possibly allow
separate or independent (kobetsu) military action
in defence of Japan. And such construction still
might permit Japan to coordinate an erstwhile
"independent" military action with another state.
But "in defence of Japan" could mean only in the
event of a direct armed attack or, perhaps
construed more broadly, to include military action
in the region against, for example, North Korea,
even in response to less imminent but real threats
to Japanese security and, perhaps even preemptive
action. Each of these views could still restrict
Japan's capacity either to maintain its own
military forces or to participate with such forces in
any direct combat engagement not directly related
to the defence of Japan, or both. Moreover, to the
extent that military forces could possibly be used
for both aggressive and defensive actions, or
autonomously, it could be argued, an as-yet tacit
line demarcating the parameters of article 9 would
have been transgressed.
The formally expressed views of the Bureau
may have left unresolved many soon-to-become-
critical issues, but they did provide needed
legitimacy for policies pursed by successive
cabinets. In some instances, the Bureau also
provided political cover. In June 1994, for
example, Tomiichi Murayama, long-time leader of
the Social Democratic Party (SDP, prior to 1991
the Socialist Party) became prime minister,
forming an LDP/SDP coalition cabinet.
Questioned in the Diet about how, as SDP leader,
he could disavow one of his party's ideological
pillars that the SDF and, indeed, the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty were unconstitutional
Murayama replied that as prime minister, he was
Nakamura Akira, Sengo setii ni yureta kenpO 9J6. Naikaku
HOsei Kyoku no jishin to tsuyosa (The Inpact of Constitution
Article 9 on Postwar Politics: The Confidence and Strength of
the Cabinet Legislation Bureau) (Tokyo, Chuo Keizai Sha,
1996) at 180-82, quoting statements made by Bureau Director
Hayashi in March 1960 [Akira].
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now compelled to adhere to the opinion of the
Cabinet Legislation Bureau.60
The Bureau's official views have established
parameters for government policy that have also
been very difficult to alter and thus have enduring
influence. A small agency with only a handful of
core staff consisting almost entirely of career
personnel assigned from other ministries to serve
in the Bureau for extended periods of time, 61 the
Bureau has become an elite agency within the
bureaucratic hierarchy. Transfer to the Bureau
represents a plum assignment for young officials
with strong legal credentials. This prestige
reinforces respect within other ministries for the
legal expertise of the Bureau, which in turn
contributes to the deference given to its opinions
on proposed legislation as well as its interpretative
pronouncements. The Bureau also shares
organizational orientations with these other elite
bureaucracies, which produces remarkable
cohesion and continuity.62 All key positions in the
First Department, the division responsible for
advisory opinions on the constitutionality of
proposed legislation, including Japan's defence
policies, are, presently at least, held by graduates
of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law. 63 All
members of the department's key staff thus have
a common educational background and
presumably share, within limits, general
perspectives on law and the constitution. The
general tendency within any agency to defer to
past positions is thus compounded where career
affiliations create even greater cohesion.
Moreover, senior Bureau officials inculcate
internal values that reinforce agency ideology as a
politically autonomous, professional agency. It
claims legal expertise and authority second only to
the judiciary. And some within the Bureau are said
to view their product - expert opinions
interpreting legislation and the constitution as
even more legally authoritative than judicial
hbid. at 1-3.
For a series of essays mostly reminiscences by former
directors and staff that provide instructive insight on the
Bureau, its functions and its values, see Naikaku H6sei Kyoku
Hyakkunenshi Henshu I'inkai, supra note 58.
62 For analysis of the organizational features of Japan's most elite
bureaucracy and their consequences, see John 0. Haley, "The
Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy and the
Public Trust," online: Washington University of St. Louis
Faculty Working Papers <law.wustl.edu/Academics/Faculty/
Workingpapers/TheJapaneseJudiciarylO 03.pdf>.
63 Seikan yOran (Civil service directory) (Tokyo: Seisakushu
Ai.Bi, 2003) at 603-604.
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precedents.64 Thus, Bureau views, particularly its
statutory and constitutional interpretations, have
exceptional influence and endurance. For the
Bureau to disavow, or even modify, any long-
standing legal interpretation also exposes it to
political pressures that undermine its sense of
autonomy as well as public trust in its neutrality
and professionalism. As a result, the Bureau's
interpretation of article 9 has not only politically
bound successive governments, it is also
exceedingly difficult for even the Bureau itself to
alter. As a recent director of the Bureau is quoted
as having stated, "[c]abinets may change, [our]
constitutional interpretations do not. 65
On the two most basic issues - the
constitutionality of mutual security arrangements
with the United States and the SDF the Bureau's
opinions pose few problems, except for the few
who continue to insist that either or both are
unconstitutional. The Bureau's interpretations
reflect and buttress official governmentviews,
which have been broadly, if not universally,
shared at least since the Commission on the
Constitution (1957-1964)66 issued its final report
and the single most authoritative non-judicial
construction of article 9. In the report, nearly all of
the commissioners agreed that:
Under Article 9 as it stands, the system of
defence, including the Self-Defence
Forces, entry into the United States, and
the security treaty with the United States,
Narita Yoshiaki, "Gakusha no me kara mita Naikaku H6sei
Kyoku" in Naikaku H6sei Kyoku Hyakkunenshi Henshu
I'inkai, supra note 58 at 269.
Quoted in Akira, supra note 59 at 3.
The Commission, chaired by University of Tokyo Professor of
Law, Kenzo Takayangi, was established by statute (Law No.
140) in 1956 to study the constitution and make
recommendations to the cabinet. The Socialist Party denounced
the Commission and refused to participate in its deliberations
despite repeated efforts. Nevertheless, the Commission's report
can be viewed as the most authoritative study of the postwar
constitution, including problems of interpretation and
application. For an English -language treatment of the
Commission and its work, including translation of its Final
Report, see John M. Maki, Japan's Commission on the
Constitution: The Final Report (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1980). In January 2000, a similar effort to
review the constitution was initiated by the lower house of the
Japanese Diet. It issued an interim report in November 2000.
Although it included calls for revision, this report did not itself
make such a proposal. See ibid.
is both acceptable and not
unconstitutional.6
Those who disagreed, the report continued,
argued that article 9 should be revised to make
Japan's defence system constitutional, with a
majority supporting revision at least for the sake
of clarification.6 8
Official and public acceptance of this
interpretation has allowed Japan to steadily in-
crease financial and operational responsibility for
its own defence and progressively expand its
military capability since 1952. Under the 1957
Basic Policy for National Defence and the Japan-
U.S. Security Treaty as revised in 1960, Japan
continued to provide infrastructural support and
territory for U.S. bases in Japan in return for U.S.
military protection. During what some char-
acterize as a period of "flexible inter-pretation, 69
all postwar governments expanded the capacity
and role of the SDF. Although in 1976 the Miki
cabinet limited defence spending to 1 percent of
the GNP, given the size of the Japanese economy,
this limitation still enabled Japan to maintain the
third or fourth largest defence budget of any single
nation on the globe. 0
The revisions to the U.S.-Japan Mutual
Security Treaty in 1960 expanded territorial scope
for military consultation and cooperation to
include threats to international peace and security
throughout East Asia. 71 Cabinet Legislation
Bureau opinions, however, stated that despite
treaty language, Japan could only participate in so-
called collective security arrangements
independently to defend against direct threats to
Japan.72 This opinion remains the politically
controlling interpretation of article 9. Successive
governments continue to reject domestic as well as
overseas calls for active SDF combat participation
in UNPKO as well as collective security
operations.
67 Ibid. at 271.
Ibid. at 271-72.
See Auer, "Article Nine," supra note 32 at 74.
As of 2000, in terms of U.S. dollars, only the defence budgets
of the United States, China (estimates), and France exceed
Japan's.
See Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the
United States of America and Japan, 19 January 1960, U.S.-
Japan, II U.S.T. 1632, art. IV.
71 See Shfizo, supra note 58.
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Since 1960, two significant formal
developments occurred in U.S.-Japan bilateral
security relationships. The 1978 Guidelines for
Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation 7' dealt primarily
with what is euphemistically referred to as
"burden-sharing," or Japan's perceived duty to
share an increased proportion of the costs of
mutual defence, notably for U.S. bases in Japan.
These guidelines were renegotiated under the
Clinton administration, resulting in the 1997
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation,"
which clarified Japan's military role in the event
of actions in the region. Iraq's 1990 invasion of
Kuwait, and the ensuing crisis and military
engagement in the Persian Gulf, forced the issue.
Under severe political pressure from the United
States, Prime Minister Kaifu dispatched four
minesweepers for cleanup operations in 1991 and
his successor, Prime Minister Miyazawa, sent
army engineers as peacekeepers to Cambodia in
1992. Forced with having to make a decision, they
articulated what has become the prevailing view:
article 9 prohibits any deployment of combat
forces for collective security measures in the
absence of a direct threat to Japanese security.
Otherwise, opinions in the early 1990s varied.
Some would have allowed non-combat forces to
participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Others
argued that constitutional amendment is necessary,
and still others opined that the SDF could
participate as UN forces without constitutional
amendment. 7' By the mid-1990s a series of
proposals for constitutional revision had been put
forward. 6 The new century began in Japan with
the appointment in January 2000 of a House of
Representatives Research Committee to study the
issue of constitutional revision once more.
See Japan Defence Agency, "Guidelines for Japan-U.S.
Cooperation (1978)," in Defence of Japan 1979 (White Paper)
(Mainichi Daily News, 1979) at 187.
-4 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, The Guidelines
for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation, (23 September 1997) 36
International Legal Materials. 1621. For an analysis in English,
see Chris Ajemian, "The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defence Guidelines
Under the Japanese Constitution and Their hnplications for
U.S. Foreign Policy" (1998) 7 Pacific Rim Law & Policy
Journal 323.
Auer, Postwar Rearmament, supra note 9 at 79, citing Masashi
Nishihara, Emergency Military Roles for Japan (New York:
MacEachron Policy Forum, 1993) at 4-6.
For detailed analysis from an ardently progressive ideological
perspective with translations of the most significant proposals,
see e.g., Glenn D. Hook & Gavan McCormack, Japan's
Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis (London and
New York: Routledge, 2001).
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The attacks of 11 September 2001, the
ensuing "war on terrorism," and the renewed use
of military force against Iraq resulted in renewed
U.S. pressures on Japan to expand military
participation in collective security arrangements.
The Koizumi government responded to the 9/11
attacks with enactment on 29 October 2001 of the
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, after an
extensive three-week debate. Legislation was also
enacted amending the 1954 SDF Law, 7 allowing
Japan to commit forces to U.N. peacekeeping
operations. All measures require prior Diet
approval of any deployment outside of Japanese
waters and airspace where combat is taking
place. Without prior legislative approval, the
SDF may use force only in the event of "an
unavoidable and cause" to protect SDF lives and
safety.80 Under this legislation, at the request of
the U.S. government in November 2002, Japan
deployed in the Indian Ocean a number of support
vessels for refueling, as well as escort destroyers,
including, as noted, missile-mounted Aegis
destroyers with advanced radar capability. These
measures reflected the concern that, absent a
credible direct threat to Japanese national security,
the use of force even in the context of the
collective security measures would violate article
9." The government's response was to allow such
use for force only with specific legislative
approval. Perceptions of a more direct threat by
North Korea have intensified the debate. In June
2003, the Diet enacted emergency amendments to
these three statutes. The changes are to provide
greater flexibility for SDF participation in
collective security and "anti-terrorist" military
actions, as well as to enable more rapid SDF
response to potential direct military threats to
Heiseijeisannen kugatsujichinichi no Amerika gasshilkoku ni
oite hassei shita terorisuto yoru k6geki nado ni raid shire
okowareru kokusai rengO kensho no mokuteki tassei no tame no
shogaikoku no katsudomni taishite wagakuni ga jissei suru
sochi oyobi kanren suru kokusai rengo ketsugi nado ni
motozuku d6teki sochi ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi ho (The
Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Taken by Japan
in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries Aiming to
Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in
Response to the Terrorist Attacks that Occurred on 11
September 2001 in the United States of America as well as
Humanitarian Measures Based on Relevant Resolutions of the
United Nations), Law No. 113 (2001).
Jieitai ho, (Self-Defence Forces Law), Law No. 65 (1954) as
am. by Law No. H 5 (2001).
79 See e.g., Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, supra note 77,
art. 5.
o See e.g., ibid, art. 12(1).
See e.g., Editorial, Japan Times (21 November 2002); Editorial,
Asahi Shimbun (20 November 2002)
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Japan, including, some have suggested, the use of
preemptive strikes.82 Then in January 2004, again
in response to U.S. requests for Japan to send
military forces to Iraq, the cabinet proposed and
the Diet enacted legislation authorizing the
dispatch of troops.83  Without constitutional
amendment or a permissive Supreme Court
decision, however, the Koizumi cabinet, like
others, has been forced to justify its defence
policies within the verbal parameters established
over three decades ago by the Cabinet Legislation
Bureau - combat activity in a collective security
operation against a state that has not attacked or
posed a direct threat to Japan's own security is not
allowed under article 9. Thus, the dispatch of 500
GSDF personnel to Iraq in February 2004 was
justified as a humanitarian mission to aid in Iraq's
reconstruction.84 However, the 2003 White Paper
on Defence Policy contains a subtle change in
wording. Every White Paper on Defence Policy
since 1981 had disallowed any dispatch of forces
abroad "for the purpose of using force" (buryoku
kdshi no mokuteki o motte as officially
translated). 5 The 2003 White Paper, as noted by
Hitotsubashi University Professor Ichir6 Urata,
slightly rephrased the statement to reject the
dispatch of forces with "the use of armed force as
its purpose" (buryoku kdshi o mokuteki to shite).86
Any difference in meaning, at least as translated,
seems slight, but there is a possible nuance in the
more recent statement that incidental, as opposed
to intentionally planned, use of force is
constitutionally permissible.
Having once justified policy on the basis of
the Bureau's interpretations successive
governments have, in effect, become politically
bound to follow the Bureau's pronouncement. The
Bureau itself is even less able to change what it set
forth as a politically neutral, expert opinion. As
Bureau Counselor Kazuhir6 Yagi recently noted,
quoting the preexisting language of the official
See e.g., Alan Boyd, "Awakening Japan's sleeping defence
giant" Asia Times Online (28 May 2003), online: Asia Times
Online <www.atim es.com /atim es/Japan/EE28Dh0 1 html>.
83 lraku shien tokubestu sochi h6 (Iraq Assistance Special
Measures Law), Law No. 137 (2003).
See e.g., online: Asahi <http://www.asahi.com/politics/ update/
0202/004.htm l>.
See online: Japan Defence Agency <http://www.jda.go.jp /e/
top/main.htm>.
Urata Ichir6, "Sengo kenp6 seiji9 ni okeru 9 j6 no igi (Meaning
of Article 9 in the Context of Postwar Cconstitutional Politics)"
(2004) 1260 Jurisuto 50 at 54.
defence policy statement on the illegality of
dispatching SDF forces abroad with an intent to
use armed force, it is difficult to set out a
persuasive interpretation that in effect eradicates
one that has prevailed for half a century. 7 The
resulting political inflexibility sustains pressures
to amend the article. Yet the Japanese people
appear to approve the current structure of rather
ill-defined, yet durable constraints on Japan's
capacity to wage war.
Both electoral results and public opinion polls
have long revealed what most observers have
viewed as a paradox if not a contradiction. By
significant majorities, the Japanese people appear
to oppose any revision of article 9, but support the
SDF and their deployment with legislative
sanction. The seemingly antithetical aspects of
these views can be reconciled if one accepts the
proposition that the public is willing to allow an
armed force but only within parameters that are
still ill-defined. So long as article 9 remains, the
government is constrained by the need for
legislative approval and at least potential judicial
objection. Thus, by gradual evolution, a consensus
seems to have emerged allowing the maintenance
of armed forces, but limiting their use to non-
combat roles that also have explicit legislative
approval. In a sense, the Japanese have
transformed a constitutional provision designed to
protect Japan's neighbors from militaristic
nationalism into one that protects the Japanese
people from the burdens of war. Whether the
public would support blanket legislative approval
of military forces and their use in combat
operations remains to be seen. At some point, the
courts could still step in, reasoning that the
legislature had overstepped the bounds of its
supremacy by approving measures in
"unmistakable" contravention of article 9.
The current debate over SDF deployment and
the legal capacity to engage in combat in
collective security and "anti-terrorist" actions also
implicates the long-standing understanding that
whatever the allowance for "defensive" weaponry,
article 9 prohibits the maintenance of "aggressive"
military armaments. Thus, for article 9 to be
meaningful as construed, a viable distinction has
7 Yagi Kazuhir6, "Kenp6 9 j6 ni kansuru seifu no kaishaku ni
tsuite (Concering the Government's Interpretation of Article 9
of the Constitution)" (2004) 1260 Jurisuto 68 at 74.
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to be made both between "aggressive" versus
"defensive" wars, as well as, in technological
terms, the "aggressive" or "defensive" nature of
"war potential." If no distinctions on these
grounds can be reasonably made, then article 9, as
construed, becomes irrelevant. Either, as Prime
Minister Shigeru Yoshida may have feared, Japan
could constitutionally justify any military
engagement (or maintain any sort of military
weaponry, including nuclear weapons in the name
of "self-defence") or, because of possible
aggressive use, no "war potential" of any sort
could be maintained. As noted above, Kades
himself admitted that, in drafting the original
version of article 9, concern over American
perceptions that Japan could justify a revival of
militarism and return to armed adventurism led
him to exclude any explicit reference of the right
of self-defence and to leave unlimited its broadly
worded renunciation of war and prohibition of war
potential.
However difficult a distinction between
"aggressive" and "defensive" military action may
seem, a military establishment can be reasonably
characterized as offensive or defensive in terms of
capability. James Auer thus makes a persuasive
case that Japan's contemporary military
establishment is, as a matter of capability,
essentially defensive. 8 In Auer's view, Japan "has
sincerely endeavored to live within the spirit of
Article 9... in building a meaningful but limited
defence capability, clearly complementary to
rather than autonomously separate from U.S.
military power."' 9 Current statistics confirm
Auer's assessment of Japanese military capacity.
Japan's defence budget in 2000 was 45.6 billion
U.S. dollars. The GSDF (army) had 148,500
active personnel, divided into twelve combat
divisions, with 1070 tanks, and ninety attack
helicopters, with additional artillery/air defence
guns and missiles. The Maritime Self-Defence
Force, on the other hand, had 42,600 active
personnel with sixteen SSK submarines, fifty-five
principal surface vessels, thirty-one minesweepers,
and nine carriers with a 12,000-person marine air
arm with eighty combat aircraft and eighty armed
helicopters. Finally, in 2000, the Air Self-Defence
Force had 44,200 active personnel, 331 total
combat aircraft with supporting air defence guns
Auer, "Article Nine," supra note 32 at 69-86.
Thid. at 83 [emphasis in the original].
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and missiles. With less than one-third of Japan's
population, South Korea is reported to have about
560,000 armypersonnel, 2,250 tanks, 4,850 pieces
of field artillery, 2,300 armored vehicles, 150
multiple rocket launchers, thirty missiles, and 580
helicopters. The South Korean navy has 67,000
personnel, 200 vessels, including submarines, and
sixty aircraft. The South Korean air force has
approximately 63,000 personnel and 780 aircraft,
including KF-16 fighters.90
North Korea, in contrast, is estimated to have
700,000 active military personnel, 2000 tanks and
1600 military aircraft, and navy of over 800
ships.9' In sum, in terms of personnel, Japan has
the smallest military establishment in East Asia.
However, in terms of budget and technology, it
has the most costly, advanced and well-equipped
armed forces in the region, one whose defensive
capacity is second only to the United States but
whose ability to project military power beyond its
shores is relatively weak.
In light of both the inherent difficulty in
distinguishing between "offensive" and
"defensive" weaponry and the military strength of
neighboring states, Japan's current political
consensus that the SDF should be allowed but
their activities restricted has a commonsense
appeal. The potential threat to Japanese security in
the region is real. Moreover, to the extent that the
underlying concern informing the prohibition
contained in article 9 is Japan's capability to
wage an aggressive war, limiting the SDF to non-
combat functions in any collective security action
seems to strike an appropriate balance. It is at least
one that has obvious appeal to the Japanese public,
who have good reason to support the existence of
the SDF but, given the memory of wartime
suffering, prefer to avoid putting Japanese
soldiers, sailors, and airmen in harm's way unless
necessary for Japan's vital interests. Yet, reliance
on a four-decade-old bureaucratic interpretation of
See "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2005 and
After" (approved 10 December 2004), online: Japan Defense
Agency <http://www.jdo.go.jp/e/index_.htm>. For 2003 and
comparative figures see The Dejense Monitor 32:5
(November/December 2003), online: Centre for Defense
Information <http://www.cdi.org/news/defense-
m onitor/din.pdf>.
U.S. Department of Defense, 2000 Report to Congress, Military
Situation on the Korean Peninsula (12 September 2000),
online: U.S. Department of Defense <http://www.defenselink.
m il/news/Sep2000/koreaO9l22000.html>.
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article 9, pronounced in a political context far
removed from the present, makes less sense. A
more permissive constitutional interpretation, one
that would permit legislative action, would seem
better. A legislative direction would allow more
flexible responses to changing international and
regional developments that may affect Japanese
security but still ensures a democratic check on the
use of force. And were the legislature to go
beyond limits set by a judicially perceived "sense
of society," the Supreme Court might speak at last.
John 0. Haley
Wiley B. Rutledge Professor of Law & Director,
Whitney R. Harris Institute for Global Legal
Studies
School of Law, Washington University
johaley@wulaw.wustl.edu
(2005) 14:2 CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM
HeinOnline  -- 14 Const. F. 34 2005
